Review

The author just finished reading:

FIGHTING IN THE GRAY ZONE:
A STRATEGY TO CLOSE THE PREEMPTION GAP
Joanne M. Fish
Samuel J. McCraw
Christopher J. Reddish
September 2004

Academians can understand persuit of a document to the end, though the Reader disagrees with the basic precepts outlining the work. The above listed Work was of this order. Some excerpts to give perpective:

The NSS provides a comprehensive list of
rogue state attributes but then sidesteps important
issues such as how to apply the criteria, how to
identify and track rogue states, and when use of
force is authorized. To rectify these shortfalls,
we develop conceptual thresholds, or trigger
points, for each of the three components of the
converged threat. Only when all three threat
trigger points are crossed is the use of force
sanctioned (represented by the crosshatched
triangle in Figure 4). It is important to ensure no
single threshold inadvertently or prematurely
instigates military force. With the limited utility
of estimating reaction time for threats in the gray
zone, there is no proposed trigger point directly
related to threat timelines.

1) when FCP is
employed, the President needs the legal
authority to treat detainees as POWs—the
Geneva Convention’s categories of armed
confl ict and war are not suffi cient for the
converged threat;77 2) the military tactical
rules of engagement must be adapted for
use against converged threats;78 and, 3) the
United States must review posse comitatus
to establish new appropriate boundaries for
using the breadth of military capabilities
in operations synchronized with law
enforcement

FCP can be used as a quick in and out operation,
leaving basic elements of sovereignty intact; or it
can disrupt the converged threat and contend
with the underlying causes by forcing a regime
change. The decision to affect regime change is a
function of reaction time, maturity of the WMD
threat, and state disregard or unresponsiveness to
international resolutions
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Serious errors with this document:
1) Using Triggers, especially publicized Triggers, gives miscreants the ability to maintain either low visability, or disperse their activities across national borders--never tripping all three Triggers. (Case in Point: N.Korea is widely known to be planning to sell nuclear weaponry to rogue states, once their nuclear program is up and running.)

2) United States should never announce under what Conditions the U.S. Military will intervene; such publication abandoning the element of Surprise, and constrains Our own Initiative.

3) American pursuit of International support remains the wrong approach; International Sovereignties will never condone concepts of regime change as International policy. American policy should instead develop a publicized context of Intervention/Invasion. (The Author proposed a detailed scheme in a published Work: it's major elements consisted of: a mandated 30-Day period of Operation--exit whether Mission Goals had been accomplished or not; stated Mission Goals of Individual pursuit or Complex destruction; total and unilateral military action--the United States will enter and exit upon it's own discretion, without response or reply to any other nation; and the Military will not pursue Economic or Civilian targets.)

4) FCP advocates treating foreign Nationals as POWs, because of Triggers being tripped, with no reference to question of their guilt or association with Terrorism, Rogue states, or WMD.

5) Use of Force is a nulification of negotiation. Reestablishment of foreign relations holds little function when One Side can use obvious force. We should go in because of Need, stay only an established time, and use the phrase "We'll be back" if We need to be. lgl