Crisis Group Middle East Report N°34 22 December 2004
WHAT CAN THE U.S. DO IN IRAQ?

A fair and balanced effort which uses non-statistical polling of Iraqis through Interviews. It provides true insights into the American effort in Iraq.


events since the occupation have
reinforced latent distrust while dissipating much of
the early goodwill


failure to restore
law and order and prevent widespread looting in the
war's immediate aftermath, the deployment of
inadequate numbers of troops, excessive use of force
in populated areas, over-reliance on Iraqi exiles and
heavy-handed selection of the country's leadership,
the Abu Ghraib prison scandal, wholesale dissolution
of the army and indiscriminate exclusion of senior
Baath party members, insufficient and inefficient use
of reconstruction funds, and marginalisation of the
Sunni Arab community, among others. . . .
As a result, U.S. missteps are largely
viewed as intentional, its statements as hypocritical,
and its supposed undeclared agenda (long-term
domination of Iraq) as responsible for the armed
opposition's violence.


Many compare the time it is taking with the spectacular
recovery produced by Saddam Hussein after the 1991 Gulf
war. Crisis Group interviews in Iraq, April 2003-September
2004.


Uncertainty about the future reportedly has led some highlevel
officials to protect their personal interests. As one Iraqi
explained, the expression "ani moo abu taweela" -- literally, "I
am not among those who last" -- increasingly is being used by
ministers and senior officials to justify graft. Crisis Group
interview, Baghdad, September 2004


Evidence of insufficient numbers of troops
abounds. Thus, the fighting in Najaf up to late August 2004
required participation of troops from as far away as Mosul,
creating security vacuums in other areas, such as Latifiya,
which armed insurgents quickly invested. A military analyst
also remarked on the connection between troop levels and
reconstruction efforts: "there are insufficient military resources
to even keep contractors safe".


a U.S. statement of intent to remain in Iraq for a
prolonged period of time has become virtually
unsaleable. In other words, even though the
administration may still have considerable military
and financial resources at its disposal, its ability to
expend them is critically limited by its dwindling
political capital. As for proponents of a rapid
withdrawal, they, too, fail to take full account of the
existing context.27 Given their extreme frailty, Iraqi
institutions would probably not survive a precipitous
disengagement, handing the insurgents a significant
victory. A swift withdrawal also could imperil broader
U.S. interests in the region and further destabilise the
region as a whole.


a U.S. statement of intent to remain in Iraq for a
prolonged period of time has become virtually
unsaleable. In other words, even though the
administration may still have considerable military
and financial resources at its disposal, its ability to
expend them is critically limited by its dwindling
political capital. As for proponents of a rapid
withdrawal, they, too, fail to take full account of the
existing context.27 Given their extreme frailty, Iraqi
institutions would probably not survive a precipitous
disengagement, handing the insurgents a significant
victory. A swift withdrawal also could imperil broader
U.S. interests in the region and further destabilise the
region as a whole.
=================
The Report implies that the American effort in Iraq has already failed, and this Author concurs. He disagrees with the Report, in that he calls for immediate withdrawal of American forces. Iraqis now view American presence as Occupation, rather than Liberation. Iraqi society retains its sectarian construction, making the creation of national parties impossible, the best scenario would be creation of a Confederation--much like that of early American history, or the Swiss cantons. The current situation is counterproductive to American interests, as it portrays American policy ineptitude alongside of popular American resentment of American Casualties.

Precipitate American withdrawal could even be to American advantage. It might even be to American benefit if such a Withdrawal brought on an Iraqi Civil War. The United States cannot gain any International support for the current Occupation. The vacuum created by American evacuation would propel Islamic intervention, if not an International effort. Any failure in the Iraqi context thereafter would excuse American difficulties, and reestablish American prestige. lgl