The Future Combat System

GAO-05-442T March 16, 2005
DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS
Future Combat Systems
Challenges and Prospects
for Success
Statement of Paul L. Francis, Director,
Acquisition and Sourcing Management


The Future Force is to be offensively
oriented and will employ revolutionary operational concepts, enabled by
new technology. This force is to fight very differently than the Army has in
the past, using easily transportable lightweight vehicles, rather than
traditional heavily armored vehicles. The Army envisions a new way of
fighting that depends on networking the force, which involves linking
people, platforms, weapons, and sensors seamlessly together.

FCS is a family of 18 manned and unmanned ground vehicles, air vehicles,
sensors, and munitions that will be linked by an information network.
These include, among other things, eight new ground vehicles to replace
current vehicles such as tanks, infantry carriers and self-propelled
howitzers, four different unmanned aerial vehicles, several unmanned
ground vehicles, and attack missiles that can be positioned in a box-like
structure.

The Author has serious reservations about the FCS. He first doubts the FCS will come online within the Timeline stipulated, the scheduled Phase-Out of the M1 tank and Bradley Fighting Vehicle seems more likely. The delay will not cost $3.5b per year as the Report estimates, but far more likely $12b per year. The Time Delay, and there will be one, will be Lead-Time for competing Powers to develop Counteractive measures to the Weapons systems. It can be simply put with the statement: All potential Contending Powers will have Tech-level Forces equivalent to current Army complement by 2015, and such a Force development will be capable of sustained injury to the proposed 15 Future Force brigades proposed under FCS.

Future Contending Powers will have current Tech-Force capability developed in depth in the Future. China can be estimated to possess 20 Divisions, but at least 20 other Nations will have at least 3 Divisions. The slight construction of the proposed Vehicles and Weapons systems will place American forces at a disadvantage, both in Numbers and concentration of Firepower. There will be attrition of American forces, with insufficiency of Vehicle replacement; We need Vehicles much cheaper in Cost, less costly to train operating personnel, and replaceable with faster Production methods.

Current mobility doctrines in vogue among the Army leadership propels them to discount the need for the proper installation of lines of communication. They suggest Future Force brigades could be deployed independently for 3-7 Days. It sounds good, and stands consistent with mobility doctrine, but confrontation with opposing military units--rather than running through the Enemy hinterland--can burn a Full Combat Load within twelve hours. Previous Combat experience against effective Opposing Force has shown Air Supply of isolated Forces will not be sufficient longer than a two-week period.

The Army has to learn We lucked out facing technologically inferior forces in the recent Past, but it is an element of superiority which will be soon gone. China is yearly bringing into Main Force Weapons systems capability to deal equally with current Army forces, and which will allow a 30% Attrition rate upon proposed FCS forces in fullscale engagement. Army leadership had better review the principles of concentration of mass, effective lines of communication, and Reserve complements under the operating conditions of long Engagements.

Congress need know the FCS will cost an eventual one-half trillion Dollars, be insufficient for either extended deployment or long engagement against competitive force, and does not have Production Time efficacy for resupply of Attrition. lgl